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ABSTRACT

This Article explores the idea that a faculty member acting in
the role of an academic researcherin the scientific disciplines should be
viewed in the context of patent law as an autonomous entity within the
university rather than as an agent of the university. The structure of
the university laboratory within the university and the social norms
associated with the activities that members of the research laboratory
conduct supports such a view. Additionally, the data from the
implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act reveal that universities and
faculty scientists have different goals and motivations regarding the
transfer of new technology to the private sector. Acknowledging a
distinction between the university and its academic researchers would
revive the application of the experimental use exception as a defense to
patent infringement for the scientists who drive the innovation economy
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of our country. Also important, this distinction has implications for
the way that entrepreneurship is defined in the context of academic
researchers. A better understandingof academic entrepreneurshipmay
lead universities to restructure incentives to encourage academic
researchers to participate in transferring new inventions from the
laboratoryto the private sector.
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Dr. Anna Lucard, 1 a biomedical researcher at State University,
holds the BigPharma® Endowed Chair in Molecular Biology. She
spends much of her time on administrative duties such as her
appointment as the chair of the Department. However, her driving
force for entering academia was her research on genetic mutations
that lead to breast cancer. Most of the funding for the research comes
from government agencies such as the National Institutes of Health,
but smaller amounts of money flow in from non-profit grants and
industry collaborations. These multitudes of funding sources come
with different benefits and drawbacks. Because of the availability of
government funding, Dr. Lucard is able to explore avenues of research
that do not seem to be immediately marketable. On the other hand,
her industry collaborations help her feel as though she is making an
immediate impact on the health of society, and has enabled her to buy
a new multi-thousand dollar piece of equipment for general laboratory
use. During that same period, Dr. Lucard has used government
funding to isolate a genetic mutation and determined that it
potentially could be used to screen for a particularly aggressive form
of cancer. The university, which left her to plan, fund, and conduct
her research on her own, is now pressuring her to patent the invention
Dr. Lucard
so that the university can license it to LittleBiotechT.
understands that she is required by law2 and by contract 3 to disclose
the new technology to the university, but she would prefer to publish
the information to engage the scientific community and support her
next grant rather than pursue a patent. 4 She is unclear why the
university is suddenly taking an interest in the technology developed
during her research when its prior interest had been limited to the
amount of overhead money she was bringing in to fund the building
renovations. Some days, Dr. Lucard would just like to hide in her
laboratory and forget that her university responsibilities exist.

Dr. Lucard and her story are fictional but representative of many faculty members
1.
at universities across the United States.
Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as
2.
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)).
Most universities have policies in place requiring faculty members to assign any
3.
inventions developed during employment by the university. See, e.g., DUKE UNIV., FACULTY
HANDBOOK: POLICY ON INVENTIONS, PATENTS, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER P-9 (2008), available

at http://olv.duke.eduflnventors/PoliciesAndProcedures/policy-on-inventions.pdf.
Dr. Lucard could both patent and publish the invention, but due to time restrictions
4.
and personal beliefs regarding ownership of publicly funded inventions, she may choose to focus
on publication. For a fuller discussion of the choice between publications and patenting see infra
Parts V.B and V.C.
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Such is the life of many of today's academic researchers in the
sciences. The university has become an increasingly commercial place
with endowed chairs and licensing pressures. 5 A researcher's one
potential avenue of escape from that commercialization is her
laboratory. In the laboratory, she alone determines what research will
be conducted.
She can choose to completely forgo commercial
involvement by applying for federal grants rather than partnerships
with industry---or not. The laboratory is her space to define.
This faculty autonomy while acting in the role of scientific
researcher has not been explicitly recognized. Instead, many scholars
lament the death of pure research, or the realm of philosophy, due to
the increased commercialization of the university in today's society. 6
In its most idealized form, the realm of philosophy is a place in which
scientific research7 is conducted in an arena free from the pressures of
commercialization, 8 a stark contrast to the world of commerce. 9 If, as
has been argued, the university is at heart a money-making corporate
endeavor,10 the realm of philosophy is certainly not to be found within
its hallowed halls. Or is it? This Article seeks to unveil the
distinction between the university and its academic researchers. It
argues that the realm of philosophy continues to be found in the
laboratories of the modern, more commercial university because each
individual
faculty
scientist
determines
the
degree
of
commercialization allowed into her laboratory.
In discussing this distinction, it must be remembered that the
university is not a monolithic structure. The university itself does not
conduct research; academic researchers within the university conduct
scientific research independently of the university in laboratories that
function as independent entities within the university.1 1
The
structure of the university research system demonstrates the
5.
See infra Part III.
6.
See, e.g., Joseph Mohr, Unshackle Academia and Allow it to Exemplify the Purposeof
Patent Law: 'To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts" 88 MARQ. L. REV. 671
(2004).
7.
Philosophy refers to "natural philosophy," i.e., science. For a full discussion, see infra
Part IV.D.1.
8.
One of the goals of creating a federally funded research system was to free scientists
from the pressures of pursuing only research with commercial implications. See, e.g., OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., A HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FEDERALLY
FUNDED
RESEARCH
AND
DEVELOPMENT
CENTERS
2
(1995),
available
at

http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9501.pdf.
9.
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966).
10.

JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER

EDUCATION (2005); see also Frank T. Rothaermel, Shanti D. Agung & Lin Jiang, University
Entrepreneurship:A Taxonomy of the Literature, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 691, 707-709 (2007).
11.
See infra Part H.A.
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12
independence of the academic researcher from the university.
Additionally, an analysis of the results of the Bayh-Dole Act, 13 which
Congress passed to incentivize the transfer of technology developed by
federally funded research from the university to the private sector,
further reveals the distinction between the university and its
academic researchers. The different incentives and motivations that
14
each group has for conducting research illustrate this distinction.
Finally, courts interpreting patent law have recognized this implicit
15
distinction in deciding some issues.
Viewing the university and its academic laboratories and
researchers as two distinct entities has a variety of implications for
patent law as well as for university technology transfer.' 6 First, the
experimental use exception' 7 to patent infringement, thought to be
inapplicable to university research since Madey v. Duke,18 would once
again be applicable to at least a subset of university research. Second,
in light of this distinction, it may be time to redefine entrepreneurship
in the context of academic researchers, recognizing that academic
researchers are quite entrepreneurial but focus on goals and
incentives quite different from the university at large. Based upon
this new definition of entrepreneurship, universities may choose to
modify the incentives to faculty for disclosing new inventions for
transfer to private industry.
This Article argues that, in the context of patent law and
innovation policy, courts, scholars, and university administrators
should view academic researchers and their research laboratories as
distinct entities from the universities in which they reside. Part I
analyzes the structure of the university laboratory and the social
norms surrounding academic researchers to support this distinction
between academic researchers and the larger university. Part II
describes the differences in goals and incentives between the academic
researcher and the university as revealed by reactions to the BayhDole Act. Part III details the implication of this distinction for the
application of the experimental use exception to academic researchers

See infra Part II.A.
12.
Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as
13.
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)).
14.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.C.
15.
16.
University technology transfer as used in this article refers to the transfer of
university-owned inventions to the private sector for further development and commercial
litigation.
See infra Section IV.
17.
18.
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

VANDERBILTJ. OFENT.AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 12:3:473

in a university setting. Part IV describes the impact of the distinction
on the discussion surrounding academic entrepreneurship and
suggests ways to incentivize academic researchers to disclose new
inventions to the university.
I. THE STRUCTURE AND HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH
SYSTEM SUPPORT THE IDEA THAT THE UNIVERSITY OPERATES AS A
DISTINCT ENTITY FROM ITS SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHERS

Faculties at universities play a number of different roles,
including lecturer, researcher, and administrator. In many respects, a
faculty member is a representative of the university. For instance,
acting as an administrator, the faculty member is reasonably viewed
as an agent of the university. Indeed, many scholars view the faculty
as agents of the university in all aspects of university life. 19 However,
the structure and history of the academic research system illustrate
the idea that when acting in the role of academic researcher, faculty
and other laboratory staff are not acting as agents of the university.
A. University Research LaboratoryStructure
The structure of a research laboratory varies depending in
large part on the organization within which it is situated. Industrial
laboratories are generally organized according to departments, and
the organization directs all research conducted in the laboratory. 20 In
contrast, university laboratories are generally organized around and
run by a Principal Investigator who has a faculty appointment. 21 The
organization of a Principal Investigator-led laboratory varies based on
the funding, space, and preferences of the Principal Investigator.
Although a Principal Investigator has departmental or school
associations, it is the Principal Investigator, rather than the school or
department, who determines the research strategy for the laboratory,
hires staff, and acquires the major grants that fund the laboratory. 22
In this manner, academic laboratories function as autonomous units
19.
Richard A. Jensen, Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Disclosure and Licensing
of University Invention: "Tle Best We Can Do with the S**t We Get to Work With," 21 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 1271, 1272 (2003), available at http://www.nd.edu/-rjensenl/research/

Disclosure.pdf.

20.
MICHAEL CROW & BARRY BOZEMAN, LIMITED BY DESIGN: R&D LABORATORIES IN THE
U.S. NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 93 (1998).
21.
Id. at 92.
22.
See, e.g., Dartmouth College Office of Sponsored Projects, Role of the Principal
Investigator,
http://www.dartmouth.edu/-osp/resources/manuallpost-award/pirole.html
(last
visited Mar. 21, 2010).
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Principal Investigator-run academic
within the university. 23
laboratories have been analogized to independent firms, 24 and the
Officer
Principal Investigator may be thought of as a Chief Executive
25
research.
laboratory
the
over
control
(CEO) who has ultimate
While a Principal Investigator conducts research in her
laboratory, her laboratory likely includes a number of other academic
researchers, as well, including research assistants, postdoctoral
26
fellows, graduate research assistants, and research technicians.
Research associates generally have a terminal degree and perhaps a
faculty appointment. 27 Such researchers may work directly for the
Principal Investigator, but often direct their own research projects
Postdoctoral fellows also have terminal
within the laboratory. 28
degrees, but work in the laboratories in a journeyman type of
position.29 Postdoctoral fellows have been trained to perform research
and are continuing to hone those skills while developing skills in grant
writing and other laboratory administrative functions in order to
30
prepare to become Principal Investigators or research associates.
Graduate research assistants work within the lab on a small aspect of
the Principal Investigator's larger project. 31 These are usually
students enrolled in a university graduate program who will use the
data collected in these apprenticeships to demonstrate the ability to
conduct scientific research. 32 Finally, most laboratories have at least
one research technician, who works directly for the Principal
33 Thus,
Investigator on research projects or general lab maintenance.

See Henry Etzkowitz, Research Groups as 'Quasi-Firms? The Invention of the
23.
EntrepreneurialUniversity, 32 RES. POL'Y 109 (2003).
Id.
24.
For an in-depth analysis of the Principal Investigator's control of the research
25.
conducted, see discussion on academic freedom infra Part II.B.
See, e.g., Dartmouth College Office of Sponsored Projects: Role of the Principal
26.
Investigator, supranote 22.
See, e.g., Simon Fraser University, Policies & Procedures, University Research
27.
Associate, http://www.sfu.ca/policies/researchlr50-Ol.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
Id.
28.
See, e.g., American Cancer Society, Research Program & Funding: Postdoctoral
29.
Fellowships, http://www.cancer.org/docrootIRES/content/RES 5_2xPostdoctoralFellowships.asp?sitearea=RES (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
Id.
30.
See, e.g., Montana State University, Division of Graduate Education, Graduate
31.
Assistantships, http://www.montana.edu/wwwdg/cat-grad-assist.shtml (last visited Mar. 21,
2010).
Id.
32.
See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook
33.
Handbook, 2010-11 Edition: Science Technicians, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosll5.htm (last
visited Mar. 21, 2010).
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within any given laboratory, there is a mix of academic researchers
who may be working for the Principal Investigator or quite
34
independently.
Funding for the laboratory generally comes from outside
sources such as government agencies and nonprofits, which further
illustrates the dichotomy between the university and faculty.
Although universities will often provide start-up funds for new hires,
faculty members in the sciences who do not procure outside funding
quickly find themselves unable to hire any type of researchers,
purchase reagents, or even have a complete salary. 35 These grants are
generally awarded in the name of the Principal Investigator's
institution, but in practice are usually portable should the Principal
Investigator move to a new institution. 36 Once a grant is received, the
university essentially becomes its landlord. Up to fifty percent of the
grant money is paid to the university in indirect costs. Funds for
indirect costs are used to pay for utilities, common equipment,
administrative support, waste disposal, and the like. The money left
after such deductions is deposited into the Principal Investigator's
faculty account, which is then used for payment of laboratory-related
expenses, including the salaries of other researchers in the
laboratory. 37
B. Scientific Norms and Academic Freedom
The independent nature of the structure of the university
laboratory is the basis for the discussion of the social norms
surrounding the research conducted within the university. Those
social norms illustrate the idea that academic researchers define a
societal group distinct from the university as an organization. Such a
distinct structure stands in contrast to scientific researchers at
commercial organizations who act on behalf of the commercial
34.
Although some academic researchers operate independently within the Principal
Investigator's laboratory so as to create a sort of mini-laboratory, this article confines its
discussion to Principal Investigators; however, proper evaluation of any given piece of research
would require an analysis of who controls the project under which it was conducted.
35.
See, e.g., FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIS. OFFICE OF FIN., HARVARD UNIV., SPENDING
POLICY FOR FACULTY START-UP AND OTHER FAS FACULTY SUPPORT FUNDS 1-4 (2008), available

at http://www.finance.fas.harvard.edu/files/policies/Faculty-Start-up-Funds.pdf.
36.
University websites often have information regarding transfer of such grants. See,
e.g., Oregon State University, Office of Sponsored Programs, Transferring a Grant or Change of
Principal Investigator, http://oregonstate.edu/research/osp/submission/transfergrant.htm (last
visited Mar. 21, 2010).
37.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, UNIV. OF MICH., POLICY STATEMENT ON THE USE
OF
FACULTY
RESEARCH
AND
DISCRETIONARY
ACCOUNTS
(2005),
available at
http://www.provost.umich.edu/reports/discretionary/policystatement.html.
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organization's interest. Social norms that are particular to academic
researchers have long been recognized to drive the actions of and
Such norms include
relationships between these individuals. 38
academic freedom and a lack of investment in the patent system in
part growing out of the free sharing of research tools and materials as
well as the publication of data in order to inform the public and other
39
researchers of the results of current research.
One of the strongest social norms among university faculty is
the norm of academic freedom. Academic freedom began as the idea
that a faculty member does not leave her opinions and thoughts at the
door when in the employ of the university. 40 While initially developed
in reference to discussions in a classroom setting, academic freedom is
equally applicable to a faculty member's role as an academic
researcher. 41 A Principal Investigator has the power to decide what
research projects to pursue and the manner in which to tackle the
42
projects.
The norm of academic freedom is particularly important when
contrasting academic research with commercial research, where the
general practice is to work on specific problems with short-range
Principal Investigators
profitability as the organization directs.
exercise the freedom to direct research based on personal interests
without bias from the university's drive to commercialize any
particular technology. This is not to say that academic researchers
are generally against the commercialization of scientific research.
When asked about university commercialization efforts, faculty are
generally supportive, but not to the extent that they would give up
academic freedom. 43 In fact, academic researchers so value the
academic freedom norm that researchers will often accept lower
salaries in order to have jobs that allow significant personal freedom

E.g., NORMAN W. STORER, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM OF SCIENCE 3 (1966); WARREN 0.
38.
HAGSTROM, THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 9 (1965).

39.
See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the
Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237 (2009); Nikolaus
Franke & Sonali Shah, How Communities Support Innovative Activities: An Exploration of
Assistance and Sharing Among End- Users, 32 RES. POL'Y 157 (2003).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
40.
See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[Academic
41.
freedom] extends as readily to the scholar in the laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom.").
42.
Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatipont & Jeremy C. Stein, Academic Freedom,
Private-SectorFocus, and the Processof Innovation, 39 RAND J. ECON. 617, 621 (2008).
43.
See Yong S. Lee, 'Technology Transfer" and the Research University:A Search for the
Boundaries of University-Industry Collaboration,25 RES. POL'Y 843 (1996).
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in the pursuit of a research agenda. 44 As a result, academic freedom is
one of the key reasons that scientists choose to enter academia rather
than industry.
An examination of the history of the governance of universities
shows that faculties have fought for academic freedom when that
freedom has been threatened. 45 Although U.S. universities are
modeled in large part after European universities, the two differ in
their methods of governance. Members of the faculty traditionally
govern European universities, thus ensuring that the faculty retains
control of all aspects of the university. 46 In contrast, boards of
trustees composed of non-academics historically govern U.S.
universities. 47 The early American institutions of Harvard University
and the College of William and Mary began in the European tradition
but rapidly adapted to the trustee model. 48
A faculty-governed
university stands in stark contrast to a laymen-governed university,
as the latter structure distances the faculty from identifying as closely
with the university as an organization. Fearing that such distant
governance would put the direction of academic research in the hands
of university administrators, faculties fought to regain some internal
control and have succeeded in the context of academic freedom. 49 As
discussed above, U.S. faculties have managed to retain the academic
50
freedoms of their European counterparts.
A second social norm that distinguishes the university from its
academic researchers is based on the generally accepted practice of
conducting academic research in the shadow of the patent system
without directly engaging the patent system. Recently, universities
have become heavily involved in the licensing 5' and enforcement 52 of

44.
Stern).
45.

Aghion, Dewatipont & Stein, supra note 42, at 618 (discussing empirical work by
See WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 28-29; RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P.

METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 120 (1955).

46.

See WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 28; HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 45, at 3-

47.

See WASHBURN, supranote 10, at 28-29; HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 45, at

11.
120.
48.

49.

See WASHBURN supra note 10, at 28-29.

Id.
See discussion of academic freedom supraPart II.B.

50.
51.
For a detailed discussion of licensing under the Bayh-Dole Act, see infra Part III.A.
52.
See generally Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008). For an overview of initial data from a recent survey of
patent litigation involving universities, see Chris Holman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. Kansas City Sch. of Law, Presentation at Santa Clara University School of Law: University
Patent Litigation (Jan. 30, 2009), availableat http://www.chtlj.org/sites/default/files/media/
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patent rights. At the same time, academic researchers have continued
to operate with their traditional disregard of the patent system and
For example, in spite of a government
the university's goals.
requirement to disclose government-funded inventions to the
university for licensing and the university's considerable interest in
licensing such inventions, academic researchers routinely publish
their inventions in scientific journals without university disclosure
rather than spending the extra time required to also disclose the
53
inventions to the university.
Additionally, because of the strong emphasis on free sharing of
materials and data,5 4 academic researchers also adhere to a social
norm of ignoring any patent rights related to a field of research.5 5 One
recent empirical study found that only 5 percent of academic
researchers try to determine if their research projects might result in
patent infringement. 56 This social norm may put the academic
researcher at odds with a university that is trying to encourage the
licensing of its own technology and is actively enforcing its own patent
rights. In fact, universities and technology transfer offices advise
academic researchers that ignoring patents covering one's research is
patent infringement and could lead to liability,5 7 usually to no avail.
The research conducted in the laboratory most vividly
illustrates the dichotomy between the faculty researcher and the
symposiums/v025/slides/holman.ppt. For examples of specific patent lawsuits, see Bill Steele,
Cornell Wins $184 Million Award from Hewlett-Packard for Patent Infringement, CORNELL
CHRON. ONLINE, June 6, 2008, http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/JuneO8/HPpatent.ws.html
and Troy Yang, University Loses Four-Year Patent Lawsuit, STAN. DAILY, Oct. 8, 2009, available
at http://www.stanforddaily.com/2009/10/08/university-loses-four-year-patent-lawsuit.
Daniel W. Elfenbein, Publications,Patents,and the Market for University Inventions,
53.
63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 688, 689 (2007); Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272.
The author notes that many researchers choose to both disclose to the university and publish;
however, publication triggers a one year statutory bar window for filing a patent. 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) (2006).
Strandburg, supra note 39, at 2248; see also Franke & Shah, supra note 39.
54.
Strandburg, supra note 39, at 2252; see also Mark A. Lemley, IgnoringPatents, 2008
55.
MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008); John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, Where
Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research,
36 RES. POLY' 1184, 1185-86 (2007).
Walsh, Cohen & Cho, supra note 55, at 1185-86, 1189-90.
56.
See, e.g., Becky Mahurin, No Research Exception in Patent Law, MSU DISCOVERY
57.
NEWSL., Sept. 28, 2006, available at http://tto.montana.edu/patentscorner/pcoct98.html; Alan B.
Bennett, Executive Dir., Univ. of Cal. Systemwide Office of Tech. Transfer & Research Admin.,
Presentation at the American Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting:
Intellectual Property and the Research Exemption: Its Impact on Science (Feb. 16, 2004),
available at http:/sippi.aaas.org/meetings/022004/presentationsbennett-exemptionffiles/
v3_document.htm; Rodney L. Sparks, In-House Patent Counsel, Univ. of Va. Patent Found.,
Presentation at the Licensing Executive Society Winter Meeting (Feb. 2006), available at
http://www.uvapf.orglivedata/documentstPatentlssuesFacingUniversities.ppt.
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university. Faculty members follow social norms that set them apart
from the university as a whole. Such social norms, including academic
freedom and ignorance of patent issues, reflect the divergent goals and
motivations that a faculty researcher and her host university hold.
C. Implicit Legal Recognition of the Distinction between the University
and Its Academic Researchers
Although the discussion of an explicit view of the university
and its academic researchers as distinct entities is a relatively novel
one, at least two lines of legal reasoning dealing with patent law
implicitly recognize that the university is inherently distinct from
those conducting research within it. The application of patent law to
determine ownership of inventions created by researchers working
within the university and the availability of sovereign immunity as a
defense against lawsuits for patent infringement both distinguish the
university from the groups performing research.
1. Patent and Invention Ownership
Historically, patent law implicitly has recognized the
independent structure of the university research laboratory and the
social norms that further separate the academic researcher and the
university. Generally, patent rights in a new technology accrue to the
inventor. 58 However, some patent rights in an invention that an
employee created will vest in the employer if the employee was hired
specifically to invent the widget.5 9 These rules apply whether the
employer is a private entity or a government office. 60 Thus, if they are
acting as distinct entities, academic researchers at both private and
state universities should own any inventions created in a university
laboratory.
Given that university faculties have a tradition of academic
freedom, university faculty members are not hired to invent but
rather to engage in general research as interests evolve. Thus, a
faculty member retains patent rights to her widget under patent
law. 6 1 Indeed, the same is probably true of graduate students in the
58.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115 (2006).
59.
See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933) (noting that an
employer retains a "shop right" to practice a patented invention if the invention is made during
work hours with employer materials).
60.
See Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890). Faculty at federal research
campuses such as those of the National Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug
Administration would be under the same rule.
61.
See Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1976).
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faculty member's lab who are co-inventors. 62 Furthermore, in the
early 1900s, universities fully recognized the research autonomy of its
faculty and allowed faculty members to patent and license inventions
generally did not want to be a
through third parties. 63 The university
64
commercialization.
part of the
All of this changed in 1980 with the passage of the Bayh-Dole
Act, 65 which requires that inventions developed by federally funded
66
research be disclosed and assigned to the sponsoring university. The
Bayh-Dole Act, together with the concomitant increase in university
emphasis on commercialization, has meant that universities generally
require all academic researchers' inventions to be assigned to the
university. 67 The history discussed above regarding invention within
and faculty
the university, however, indicates that the university
68
entities.
separate
as
traditionally viewed themselves
2. Sovereign Immunity
The application of sovereign immunity in university patent
infringement cases also illustrates the distinction between the
university and its researchers. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,69 the Supreme Court
established that a state and its universities are immune from lawsuits
alleging patent infringement.7 0 In spite of this safety net for public
universities, the applicability of sovereign immunity to the academic
researchers actually conducting the infringing research is in doubt.

See Simmons v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 209 P.2d 581 (Cal. 1949) (holding that a graduate
62.
student inventor retained rights to his invention in the absence of a contract to assign). For a
general discussion of graduate student inventor rights, see G. Kenneth Smith, Faculty and
GraduateStudent Generated Inventions: Is University Ownership a Legal Certainty?, 1 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 4 (1997).
WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 50-51.
63.

64.

Id.

Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as
65.
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)).
For discussion of the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on university commercialization
66.
and faculty relations, see infra Part III.
See generally DUKE UNIV., supra note 3; HARVARD UNIV., STATEMENT OF POLICY IN
67.
REGARD TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.otd.harvard.edul
resources/policies/IPflPPolicy.pdf; UNIV. OF CAL., PATENT POLICY (Oct. 1, 1997), available at
http://www.ucop.edulott/genresources/pat-poL97.html;

UNIV/ OF MICH., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

POLICY (June 1, 2009), availableat http://www.techtransfer.umich.edu/resources/policies.php.
WASHBURN, supra note 10.
68.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
69.
(1999).
See id.
70.
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Without explicitly recognizing the distinction between the
university and the academic researcher, some scholars have argued
that the significant disconnect between the faculty researcher and the
university may preclude the use of sovereign immunity as a viable
defense for the infringing researcher. 7 1 In Kersavage v. University of
Tennessee, one district court used just such an interpretation.7 2 In
that case, professors at the University of Tennessee, as well as the
university itself, were sued for patent infringement7 3 The court
dismissed the case with regard to the University of Tennessee on the
grounds of sovereign immunity but refused to extend the defense to
the professors.7 4 The Tennessee professors might have been able to
invoke a qualified immunity, but qualified immunity was a question of
fact and could not be dealt with by summary judgment. 75 Therefore,
the court made no decision regarding qualified immunity for the
76
professors.
The case of Riezler v. Allen has the potential to clarify this
issue. 77 In Reizler, two University of Colorado professors, Dr. Robert
Allen and Dr. Sally Stabler, were sued in an inventorship dispute. 78
In response, the professors asserted sovereign immunity based on
their actions disclosing the invention to Colorado University in their
official capacity as professors at the university 79 Like the Kersavage
court, the Riezler court did not feel that professors could invoke
sovereign immunity and rejected the motion to dismiss.80 Riezler and
Kersavage illustrate that some district courts have implicitly
recognized the distinction between the university and its faculty,

71.
Gary Pulsinelli, Freedom to Explore: Using the Eleventh Amendment to Liberate
Researchersat State Universitiesfrom Liability for Intellectual Property Infringements, 82 WASH.
L. REV. 275 (2007); Jennifer L. Owens, Note & Comment, "Not Quite Dead Yet"' The Near Fatal
Wounding of the Experimental Use Exception and Its Impact on Public Universities, 3 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 453 (2005).

72.

Kersavage v. Univ. of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).

73.

Id. at 1328.

74.
75.

Id. at 1330.
Id.

76.

Id.

77.
Riezler v. Allen, No. 108CV00332, 2008 WL 5530853 (D.Colo. Sept. 2, 2008) (Motion
to Dismiss Amended Complaint).
78.
Id. at *7.
79.
Id. at *11-13.
80.
Reizler v. Allen, No. 108CV00332, 2010 WL 1026981 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2010) (Trial
Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavit). It is possible that the professors in Riezler have a better
case for sovereign immunity than the professors in Kersavage because of the nature of the
activities at issue. Unlike Kersavage, the actions of the professors at issue in Riezler were not
alleged infringing activities in the course of scientific research, but rather compliance with the
university's disclosure policy. See id.
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open to lawsuits when the university can
leaving faculty members
81
invoke immunity.
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT DEMONSTRATES THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCHERS

Sponsorships such as the BMW Endowed Chair in Systems
83
Integration,82 the Halliburton Endowed Chair in Engineering, the
8 4 the Mars, Inc.
Electronic Arts Interactive Entertainment Program,
8 5 and the Pfizer
Endowed Chair in Developmental Nutrition,
86
Distinguished Endowed Chair in Pharmaceutical Technology leave
little doubt as to the entanglement between today's universities and
Add to such sponsorships the fact that, in 2007,
industry.8 7
88
universities received over 2 billion dollars in licensing revenue from
various inventions that academic researchers created, making it
Riezler is currently on appeal with the Federal Circuit. As this Article went to press,
81.
oral argument was scheduled for April 9, 2010. Calendar Announcement for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/calendar.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2010).
See Press Release, Clemson Univ., Clemson Hires Industry Leader as Fourth
82.
Endowed Chair for CU-ICAR Automotive Engineering Program (July 24, 2008), available at
http://www.clemson.edu/newsroom/articles/2008/July/BMW-chair.php5.
Texas
See Halliburton Foundation Endows Million-Dollar Engineering Chair at
83.
09 9 29
/0 / /
A&M (September 29, 2009), available at http://engineering.tamu.edu/newsindex.php/20
(last visited Apr.
halliburton-foundation-endows-million-dollar-engineering-chair-at'texas-am
12, 2010).
See Press Release, Sch. of Cinematic Arts, Univ. of S. Cal., Tracy Fullerton Named
84.
EA Endowed Chair (Dec. 5, 2008), http://cinema.usc.edu/about/news/usc-school-of.htm ("In 2004,
Electronic Arts made a multi-million dollar donation to the USC School of Cinematic Arts to
advance interactive entertainment and create a launch pad for the next generation of game
design ....

The Electronic Arts Endowed Faculty Chair . . . is one of the key catalysts that

enables the school to fulfill the intensifying demand for talented game developers who are solidly
grounded in visual storytelling and innovative game play.").
University of California at Davis, College of Agricultural and Environmental
85.
Nutrition,
Developmental
in
Chair
Endowed
Inc.
Mars,
The
Sciences,
http://caes.ucdavis.edu/giving/endowed-chairs#13 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
in Pharmacy, UCONN
See Janice Palmer, Pfizer Endows Distinguished Chair
86.
7 9
1
01.htm.
http://advance.uconn.edu/2004/040719/040
2004,
19,
July
ADVANCE,
Industry sponsorships may include gifts to the university or general department as a
87.
whole as well as money for research projects to be carried out by specific faculty members. See,
e.g., WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 3. Note that not all such sponsorships are named for the
sponsoring company: Harvard University's Frank Baldino, Jr. Ph.D. Professor of Sleep Medicine
endowed chair is named for the CEO of Cephalon, the company funding the endowment. See
Three HMS Endowed Chairs Named Simultaneously in Sleep Medicine, HARV. GAZETTE, May 13,
4
2004, availableat http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/200 /05.13/11-sleep.html.
See ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING
88.
FY2007 138, 142 (Robert Tieckelmann et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter AUTM
SURVEY:
ACTmTY
REPORT].
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tempting to view the modern university as just another corporate
structure. In fact, there is growing concern over the increasing
"corporatization" of the university,8 9 and many have even argued
that
universities have always been entangled with industry. 90 However,
this corporatization also illustrates the distinct motivations and goals
of the university and its faculty scientists.
A. History and Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act
Many would argue that, since academia has essentially become
a commercial enterprise, academic research should be treated as a
commercial endeavor. 91 Although some would argue that industry and
academia were intertwined before 1980,92 many scholars point to the
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act 93 as the beginning of the
industrialization of academia. 94
The Bayh-Dole Act, 95 which President Carter signed into law in
1980,96 was intended to promote the utilization of inventions arising
from federally supported research or development. 97 To accomplish
this goal, the Bayh-Dole Act provides a uniform system allowing nonprofit organizations such as universities to take title of inventions
created using federal funds. 98 In order to facilitate such a transfer of
ownership, the Bayh-Dole Act requires that the inventor assign any

89.
90.

See WASHBURN, supra note 10.

DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITYINDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED
STATES (2004); CHRISTOPHER NEWFIELD, IVY AND INDUSTRY: BUSINESS AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, 1880-1980 (2003).

91.
See WASHBURN, supra note 10.
92.
See, e.g., MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90; NEWFIELD, supra note 90; cf. id.
(differentiating between universities that were industry focused and those dedicated to pure
science).
93.
Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)).
94.
See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90; Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protectingthe Public Domain
of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004);
Rothaermel, Agung & Jiang, supra note 10.
95.
Bayh-Dole Act § 6(a).
96.
Dove Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the
Bayh-Dole System for both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.,
MEDIA AND ENT. L. J. 311, 343 (2009). For a detailed summary of the events leading up to the
signing of the Bayh-Dole Act, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1663 (1996) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research].
97.
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
98.
See Bayh-Dole-The Next 25 Years: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and
Innovation of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 110th Cong. 4 (2007).

2010]

PATENT AND UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

489

inventions made using federal funds to the organization with which
the inventor is affiliated. 99 Further, a university could then grant
exclusive or non-exclusive licenses for these inventions at its
discretion. 10 0 In 1983, President Reagan's executive order expanded
this allowance to include large businesses. 10
Scholars have debated whether the Bayh-Dole Act has had the
direct effects intended. 0 2 While the debate continues, universities
clearly have increased their efforts to transfer publicly funded
10 3
research to the private sector in the years since the Act's passage.
Thus, whether or not the increased efforts are attributed to the BayhDole Act, they have clearly occurred. Since the implementation of the
Bayh-Dole Act, the number of patents issued to universities has
increased ten-fold. 10 4 While there is some debate as to whether the
quality of those patents has also increased during this time period, the
rate of licensing indicates that universities have rights to technologies
that are attractive to private industry. 0 5 In 2007, universities
received 17,677 invention disclosures and filed 10,899 new patent
applications. 10 6 Seven percent of these new inventions were licensed
in the same year. 10 7 In total, universities executed 3,784 licenses in
2007.108

To accomplish this increase in technology transfer, universities
have become more entrepreneurial themselves-in part by setting up
technology transfer offices to coordinate patent applications, promote
technologies, and negotiate licenses. 0 9 These technology transfer

99.

Id.

Id.
100.
Eisenberg, Government-SponsoredResearch, supra note 96, at 1695-96.
101.
For an overview of the debate, see Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact
102.
of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and
Empirical Evidence to Date (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://law.wustl.edu/CLIEG/
publications/mcmaniscommercializinginnovationpaper.pdf.
See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90; see also AUTM REPORT, supra note 88.
103.
See WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 9.
104.
See Tom Coup6, Science Is Golden: Academic R&D and University Patents, 28 J.
105.
TECH. TRANSFER 31 (2003) (arguing against increased patent quality); David C. Mowery et al.,
The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities:An Assessment of the Effects of the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL'Y 99 (2001) (arguing for increased patent quality).
AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 27, 30.
106.
Id. at 29.
107.
Id. at 38.
108.
Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the
109.
Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1412 (2007) ('There were only twenty-five active technologytransfer offices in the United States at the time the Bayh-Dole Act was passed. By the twentyfifth anniversary of the Act, there were 3300."). For an overview of the literature regarding
university entrepreneurship, see Rothaermel, Agung & Jiang, supra note 10.
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offices, which are involved in the more traditional patenting and
licensing aspects of technology transfer, 110 have become a source of
revenue for many universities.'
However, other universitysponsored organizations
are also involved in the actual
commercialization of technologies. For example, many universities
help start up new companies by registering trademarks, filing
incorporation documents, and providing referrals and incubator
space. 112 A few even provide equity funding for new companies."13
This pressure to become entrepreneurial extends to the faculty
as well. Many economics scholars encourage scientific faculty to be
more entrepreneurial" 14 and have developed techniques to help them
do so." 5 Of particular interest are programs within the university
that encourage researchers to consider commercial aspects of research
during very early stage research. For example, participants in the
Technological Innovation: Generating Economic Results (TI:GER)
Program, a joint collaboration between the Georgia Tech College of
Management and Emory Law School, form teams consisting of law
school and business school students, along with a graduate student in
the sciences, to determine the commercial possibilities of the graduate
student's research. 1 6 The University of Virginia Patent Foundation
hosts graduate student interns to encourage students to learn about
technology transfer and intellectual property rights." 7
Other
universities use their technology transfer offices to encourage faculty
entrepreneurship. For example, the University of Virginia Patent
Foundation recognizes several Inventors of the Year to encourage
110.
See MOWERY ET AL., supranote 90; Rothaermel, Agung & Jiang et al., supra note 10.
111.
Dreyfuss, supra note 94; cf. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 169-71 (arguing that only
fifty percent of technology transfer offices break even).
112.
The University of Virginia has created the for-profit group SpinnerTech to provide
assistance. See Spinner Technologies Inc., http://www.spinnertechnologies.coml (last visited Mar.
23, 2010). Washington University has joined resources with local universities and other nonprofit
and for-profit entities to form a research district with laboratory space for the St. Louis area. See
Cortex, http://www.cortexstl.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
113.
See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90; Rothaermel, Agung & Jiang, supra note 10.
114.
See, e.g., Anthony A. del Campo et al., The Transfer and Commercialization of

University-Developed Medical Imaging Technology: Opportunities and Problems, 46 IEEE

TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 289 (1999); Henry Etzkowitz et al., The Future of the

University and the University of the Future: Evolution of Ivory Tower to Entrepreneurial

Paradigm, 26 RES. POL'Y 313 (2000); Trevor Grigg, Adopting an EntrepreneurialApproach in
Universities, 11 J. ENGINEERING & TECH. MGMT. 273 (1994).
115.
Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272.
116.
See Emory University School of Law, TI:GER, http://www.law.emory.edu/academics/
academic-programs/tiger.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2010); Georgia Tech College of Management,
TI:GER, http://tiger.gatech.edu/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
117.
University of Virginia Patent Foundation, Graduate Student Internships,
http://www.uvapf.orglinternships (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
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disclosure of inventions. 118 Additionally, technology transfer offices
often hold open houses or conduct presentations for the faculty to
familiarize the faculty with the offerings of the office. 119
This increased emphasis on technology transfer has also led to
a close university-industry relationship. The biggest benefit for
universities in this relationship is funding.1 20 As per capita state and
12
federal funding for universities has decreased in recent years, '
universities have used industry dollars to update facilities and
increase budgets.12 2 Additionally, industry has begun to sponsor
specific endowed chairs within university departments.1 23 Research
funding from industry has also increased during this time period from
2.1 billion dollars in 1998 to 3.4 billion dollars in 2007 for much the
same reason; however, industry funding has remained a relatively
constant percentage of overall research funding during the same time
period, varying only between seven and ten percent of overall research
funding.124 Many have argued that the increased commercialization
and closer industrial relationships conflict with the public's interest in
research that tax dollars also help to fund.125
Some scholars have argued that this academic-industry
126
relationship diverts universities from their traditional mission
because the resulting "multiversity" no longer has its focus on open
public science.1 27 Others debate whether there has ever been such a
unity of mission. The history of "pure research" institutions born in
See Press Release, Univ. of Va. Patent Found., UVAPF Honors 2009 Inventors of the
118.
Year (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.uvapf.org/live-data/live-site-page.php?page-id=
23&articleid=29.
See, e.g., University of Michigan Tech Transfer, U-M Tech Transfer Open House,
119.
http://www.techtransfer.umich.edu/news-events/success-stories/story-52.php (last visited Mar.
23, 2010); Washington University in St. Louis, Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research,
Technology Commercialization Seminar Series, http://research.wustl.edulevents[Pages/
EventDetails.aspx?EventID=294 (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
Yong S. Lee, The Sustainability of University-Industry Research Collaboration:An
120.
EmpiricalAssessment, 25 J. TECH. TRANSFER 111, 121 (2000).
WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 8.
121.
See id. at 5, 7 ("[Bluildings increasingly bore the names of corporate donors").
122.
See id. ("[E]ven academic titles were changing, with Laura D'Andrea Tyson . . .
123.
known as the BankAmerica Dean of the Haas School of Business."); see, e.g., the Kmart chair of
Marketing at Wayne State University and the examples discussed supra Part III.
See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 23.
124.
Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities and the Market for Intellectual
125.
Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. POLy ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 255-56, 273 (1998) (noting that
increased commercialization may lead to a corrosion of the mission of research universities,
undercutting public trust in these institutions).
Id. at 257.
126.
Richard R. Nelson, Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of Patenting at
127.
American Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 13, 17-18 (2001).
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1800s Germany and giving rise to graduate education in the United
States in 1876 at Johns Hopkins University can be juxtaposed against
the numerous universities that have a long history of working with
industry. 128 For example, the University of North Carolina and the
University of Kentucky have long had ties to the tobacco industry,
while the University of Minnesota historically developed iron ore
processing methods for the mining industry.129 Additionally, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology has long been a general friend
to industry. 130
Others argue that, even with such alliances,
universities were not merely suppliers of innovation to industry but
also havens of "non-utilitarian knowledge and research driven by pure
31
curiosity."1
Regardless of the history of the university mission, current
industry sponsorships raise concerns over who controls hiring and
university spending.1 3 2 It is unclear to what extent sponsoring
corporations influence how "gifts" are used. Industry research funding
and partnerships are also fraught with dangers to the independence of
scientific researchers.
Confidentiality agreements 133 between
researchers and industry sponsors and publication control by industry
sponsors threaten the free flow of information that should be an
academic norm.134
In spite of the intellectual successes shown by the 2007 patent
and licensing statistics, 35 some argue that the Bayh-Dole Act has not
had the impact that many had hoped. These critics have argued that
industry and academia have always been interconnected to a certain
degree,1 36 and that, because the relationship has always existed, the
increased licensing and technology transfer could have happened
without passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. 137 Therefore, these scholars
argue that the impetus for the increased technology transfer is the
natural progression of research to a stage where useful commercial
results can be visualized.13 8 Additionally, they argue, the increased
spending by industry has actually remained a relatively constant 7

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

WASHBURN, supranote 10, at 33; see also MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90.
WASHBURN, supra note 10.

Id.
NEWFIELD, supra note 90, at 16-17.

Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 74.

134.
135.

AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 32, 37.

136.
137.
138.

See NEWFIELD, supra note 90; WASHBURN, supra note 10.
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 90, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.

Id. at 20-22, 108-18.
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percent of the total research funding 139 over a period of years that has
seen the total number of researchers explode. 140 Others argue that the
Bayh-Dole Act has had-at most-indirect effects. One study found
that the true impetus for increased licensing is the establishment of a
technology transfer office with a number of full time employees in the
office.14 1 If these data are correct, the Bayh-Dole Act certainly would
be a strong, albeit indirect, impetus for the technology transfer
explosion because the Act is the cause of the massive creation of
142
technology transfer offices.
Some studies go so far as to say that technology transfer offices
on the whole are not successful, even in light of the statistics related
to the large amount of university licensing. 143 Of the 141 universities
granting licenses in 1999 and 2000, 80 percent of the income went to
twenty-two universities, and 45 percent of the income went to only five
universities.1 44 In 2002, two-thirds of the revenue went to licenses
from just thirteen universities. 145 By 2007, 49 percent of the gross
license revenues went to just three universities. 146 In fact, one study
estimated that 50 percent of technology transfer offices do not break
even. 147
Additionally, one argument in favor of the Bayh-Dole Act is the
need to give industry exclusive control over intellectual property
rights in order to incentivize commercialization. 148 However, in 2007,
only 43 percent of the outgoing licenses that universities executed
were exclusive. 149 Finally, in spite of the focus on research and
technology transfer, university patents are still a relatively small
percentage of total patents. Between 1969 and 2005, universities
were issued 48,612 patents 150 out of the 3.8 million utility patents and

139.

See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 23.

140.

NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, AGE DATA ON NIH PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS: 1970-2006,

availableat http://grants.nih.gov/grants/new-investigators/nih-age-data-principal_
investigators_1970-2006.xls.
Coup6, supra note 105, at 42 (2003).
141.
142.
Id. at 43.
See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 37.
143.
Bayh-Dole-The Next 25 Years, supranote 98, at 4.
144.
WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 169.
145.
See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 139-42.
146.
WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 169-71.
147.
Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research, supranote 96, at 1672.
148.
See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88, at 38.
149.
150.
PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, ELEC. INFO. PRODS. DIV., U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR

YEARS

1969-2005

(2007),

http://www.uspto.gov/go/tafluniv/org-fi/aUunivaf.htm.

For

an

explanation of the data presented, see PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, ELEC. INFO. PRODS.
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290,000 non-utility patents that were issued during that time
period, 15 1 making up only 1.2 percent of the total patents issued.
B. Lessons from the Bayh-Dole Act
Whether or not one believes in the success of the Bayh-Dole
Act, the statistics regarding university patents 152 seem to paint a
highly industrialized picture of universities and industry working
together as one unit to commercialize innovations made by academic
researchers. However, a closer investigation reveals that the effects of
the Bayh-Dole Act highlight the breach between a university and its
faculty and other academic researchers. Although the Bayh-Dole Act
seems to directly or indirectly have had an effect on the transfer of
technology disclosed to the university, its effect on the faculty is
generally less pervasive.
If the Bayh-Dole Act impacted the faculty in the same way as
the university, one would expect to see the commercialization of
research become a major focus of academic researchers. This focus
would likely result in a concomitant shift to applied research for easier
commercialization. However, the increased licensing and industry
funding seem to have had little effect on the overall type of research
being performed. 153 One external study of a twenty-five million dollar
funding deal between Novartis and the University of California
Berkeley revealed that the influx of money from industry did not
divert the focus of laboratories that were previously conducting basic
research. 154 Additionally, faculties generally remain resistant to
commercialization attempts.
One study suggests that faculty
disclosed less than 50 percent of inventions with commercial potential
to the university. 155 Most academic researchers declining to disclose
inventions did so because they did not want to take time away from
their research 156 or pursue further commercial development. 57 Such
Div., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT
GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969-2005: EXPLANATION OF DATA, http:/www.uspto.gov/go/tafluniv/

org.gr/explan.htm.
151.
PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, ELEC. INFO. PRODS. Div., U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR
YEARS 1969-2005: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORT, http://www.uspto.gov/go/stats/univ

doc/doc info_2005.htm.
152.
See AUTM REPORT, supranote 88, at 107-80.
153.
Mowery et al., supra note 105, at 100.
154.
WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 4.
155.
Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272.
156.
Id. Researchers must also fill out various disclosure forms for the university as well
as assist the technology transfer offices during patent prosecution.
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an attitude reveals that an academic researcher views her time and
research to be such a personal, rather than institutional, investment
that she will ignore federal and institutional mandates to disclose new
inventions.
This seeming contradiction between the effects of the BayhDole Act on the university and its faculty is better understood in light
of the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act-to promote transfer of technology
by the university rather than to incentivize innovation by the
faculty. 158 Although the Bayh-Dole Act requires universities to share
proceeds from commercialization of the inventor's technology with the
faculty inventor, 159 there is some reason to doubt that receiving this
revenue is a true incentive for academic researchers to disclose the
technology to the university.1 60 The idea that monetary incentives
promote university interest in technology transfer but not researcher
interest illustrates the misalignment of interests and incentives
between university administration and the faculty. When trying to
commercialize a technology, technology transfer offices have to
balance the interests of the university and the faculty16 1 because the
16 2
two groups have very different perspectives on commercialization.
While the university is highly incentivized by the money that it would
receive in exchange for the transfer of technology, the average faculty
member is more concerned with the research itself than with
commercializing it. For example, Tom Doetschman, a scientist at the
University of Arizona, 163 has created over 120 strains of transgenic
mice, all of which are freely available to other researchers, indicating
his priority for the free flow of research materials.1 6 4 Additionally, as
noted above, many faculty members choose not to pursue patenting
because of the fear that it will take time away from research.165
Often, faculty members, rather than the university, perceive a
threat from industry to academic independence and public duty. In
UNIVERSITY, INC., Jennifer Washburn, in proposing that the
Id. It is estimated that seventy-one percent of the technology licensed from a
157.
university requires further development before commercialization. Id.
Eisenberg, Government-Sponsored Research, supranote 96, at 1691-92.
158.
35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(b) (2006).
159.
See the discussion regarding the incentives of academic researchers infra Part V.
160.
Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272-73.
161.
Id. at 1273; see also Donald S. Siegel et al., Commercial Knowledge Transfers from
162.
Universities to Firms: Improving the Effectiveness of University-Industry Collaboration, 14 J.
HIGH TECH. MGMT. RES. 111, 115-16 (2003).

Doetschman,
Tom
of
Laboratory
Arizona,
of
University
See
163.
http://www.mcrp.med.arizona.eduhtml/tomdoetschman/index.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 154.
164.
Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supranote 19, at 1272.
165.
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university has become nothing more than a new corporate form due to
its relationship with industry, inadvertently provides evidence of the
distinction between the university and its academic researchers. 166
Although it is not her purpose, the book describes numerous examples
that can be re-interpreted to support an argument for divergent views
of the university and its faculty. 167 After the twenty-five million dollar
deal between the University of California Berkeley and Novartis, 168 for
example, only 41 percent of the faculty supported the alliance, while
50 percent were afraid that the industry funding would have a
negative effect on research at Berkeley. 169 Additionally, because of
faculty and student pressure on the university, internal and external
groups monitored the impact of the deal on Berkeley research. 170 Yale
University became a target of protests by faculty, postdoctoral fellows,
students, and other researchers when it claimed to be unable to help
African AIDS organizations due to exclusive licenses of its patented
HIV drugs to Bristol Myers Squibb. 171 Finally, the university's focus
on proprietary licenses with opportunities to monetize the technology
often brings it into conflict with academic researchers. For instance,
faculty members in computer science departments often push for open
source licenses for software rather than proprietary licenses, 172 and a
large percentage of knowledge and technology from academia is
transferred through publication and other informal methods which
may preclude any monetization of the technology.
Discussions of the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act clearly show
that there is a distinction between the attitude and motivations of the
university and those of its academic researchers. As a result, there is
often a disconnect between the actions of the two parties, resulting in
virulent and public disagreements between the university and its
faculty, graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and other
researchers and staff. 173

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

172.
173.

See WASHBURN, supra note 10.
See id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 164-67.
Id. at 159.
See the text accompanying footnotes 168-172 for descriptions of the results of

universities and faculty disagreements.
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III. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS ACADEMIC
RESEARCHERS REVITALIZES THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION

The patent system was established to incentivize invention by
granting exclusive rights to the patented invention during the life of
However, until recently, there generally was a
the patent.174
recognition that patents and patent infringement deal with
commercial applications rather than with research or uses for the
public good. 175 This concept resulted in a number of exceptions to the
176
general rules, including a research exception to the statutory bar,
march-in rights, 177 and the experimental use exception, a common law
exception to patent infringement established in the early nineteenthcentury.178 In its original formulation, the experimental use exception
provided a haven from patent infringement for people who used a
patented invention for philosophical inquiry or for determining if the
invention worked as disclosed.1 79

Courts have reinterpreted the

experimental use exception many times since its inception, but in the
180
past it was generally thought to apply to educational institutions.
In the past decade, the Federal Circuit has substantially
In Madey v. Duke
narrowed the experimental use exception.
University,181 a former Duke University professor brought a patent
infringement claim against the university during an ownership
contest regarding multiple pieces of laboratory equipment.18 2 Duke
defended the patent claim using the experimental use exception, but
the Federal Circuit held the doctrine inapplicable to Duke because
Duke had a "legitimate business interest" in using the patent. 8 3 As a
result, many scholars have declared that the experimental use
exception is no longer available to academic scientists. However,
recognizing that Madey applies to the university as an institution
should still allow academic researchers to continue to use the
exception under certain circumstances.
174.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

175.
See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) (quoting In re Ruschig, 343
F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1965)).
176.
Controlled research necessary to develop an invention does not put the invention
into public use. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1878).
177.
The government retains "march-in" rights to practice any patented inventions
created with federal funding in certain circumstances. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
178.
See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).

179.

Id.

180.
181.
182.
183.

See infra Part II.A.
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1362.
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A. History of Experimental Use Exception
The concept of patent law was considered important enough to
be authorized in the United States Constitution.18 4 Patents confer to
inventors the exclusive rights to exclude others from practicing their
inventions for limited periods of time 8 5 in order to incentivize the
production of new inventions. 8 6 Because of the exclusive nature of the
rights, the patent holder can sue for infringement another person who
uses the invention without a license before the patent expiration
date.1 87 However, the authors of the Constitution believed that
patents were a trade-off to benefit society. Thomas Jefferson called
them an "embarrassment" to be used only when necessary for the
public good. 188 Therefore, it should not be surprising that, throughout
much of U.S. history, patents have not been enforced against
infringers when the infringement is deemed to be for the public good.
For example, the government retains march-in rights to inventions
created with government funds so that the public is never denied the
8 9
use of a publicly funded invention due to patent infringement.
Similarly, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic drugs companies to
use patented drugs under certain circumstances so as not to extend
artificially the exclusive rights of a patent holder due to Food and
Drug Administration approval issues.' 90 Finally, patent rights initially
were not believed to be so strong as to inhibit experimentation and
tinkering.' 9'
Since the early nineteenth-century, patent rights have been
interpreted to include an exception to infringement when the

184.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (' The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
185.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
186.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
187.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
188.
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds.,
1905),
available
at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al_8_8sl2.html.
("Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of
society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.")
189.
35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
190.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). If generic companies were unable to use patented drugs
for studies to submit to the FDA, the name brand drugs would enjoy a de facto patent extension
while the generic companies completed studies required for FDA approval of sales after patent
expiration.
191.
See text accompanying footnotes 192-222.
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invention is used for experimental purposes. 192 This experimental use
exception is a common law doctrine whose origins can be traced back
to the 1813 case of Whittemore v. Cutter.1 93 In Whittemore, Justice
Story established experimental use as a defense to patent
infringement 94 when the infringement occurred during the process of
scientific research.1 95 Recognizing that the Founding Fathers had not
intended patents to preclude scientific research, Justice Story wrote
that "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to
punish a man who [used a patented invention] ... merely for
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency ... to produce its desired effects. 1 96 Justice Story went on
to further define the experimental use exception as applying to uses of
the invention in which the invention was not made for commercial
gain. 197 This not-for-profit standard was developed in the case law
and remained the test for over 150 years.1 98 During this time,
experimental use of a patented invention to improve the invention and
procure an improvement patent was not considered to be a for-profit
use.

199

The experimental use exception began evolving once again in
the late 1970s as courts began to consider the commercial interests of
the patent user. In Pitcairnv. United States,200 manufacturers used
patented technologies to build and test helicopters for the
government. 20 1 The Pitcairn court rejected the argument that use of
the patented technology for testing or evaluation of the helicopters fell
under the experimental use exception. 20 2 The Pitcairn court instead
held that the infringing tests were required to prepare the helicopters

192.

See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).

193.

Id. at 1120.

Interestingly, Justice Story also set forth the fair use exception in copyright law. See
194.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
195.

196.

Id.

Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No. 12,391).
197.
See, e.g., Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 375 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (holding
198.
that a non-infringing technology "procured by the defendant was used only for testing and for
experimental purposes"); Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (holding
that a defendant's action did not constitute infringement where the "defendant built that device
only experimentally and that it has neither manufactured it for sale nor sold any"); Bonsach
an infringing machine is made
Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F. 206, 211 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896) ("[I]f
or used as an experiment merely, it does not infringe former patents.").
Chesterfield, 159 F. Supp. at 375.
199.
Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
200.
201.
Id. at 1125-26.

202.

Id.
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for sale, and as such, the experimental use exception was not
203
available.
Subsequent decisions from the Federal Circuit have further
narrowed the application of the experimental use exception to the
point of near extinction. In Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical
Co., a generic drug manufacturer used a patented drug to perform
experiments for submission to the Food and Drug Administration once
the patents had expired. 204 The court held that the use of the
patented drug was infringing, saying that infringing activity "in the
guise of 'scientific inquiry' when that inquiry has definite cognizable,
and not insubstantial commerce prospects" is not an experimental
use. 20 5 The majority later used the Roche standard in Embrex, Inc. v.
Service Engineering Corp.20 6 to hold that testing for a commercial
purpose is infringing, even if commercialization later proves
unsuccessful. 20 7 Judge Rader's concurrence in Embrex went even
further, saying that the Patent Act disallows the experimental use
208
exception entirely.
The Embrex concurrence significantly impacted the court,
which further limited the experimental use exception in Madey v.
Duke University.20 9 John Madey, a former Duke University professor,
sued Duke over possession of a Free Electron Laser (FEL) and a
Microwave Gun Test Stand (Test Gun). 210 Professor Madey had
brought the FEL with him from Stanford University, and personally
owned patents surrounding the FEL and Test Gun. 2 11 Duke, however,
had invested in a new facility to house the FEL 212 and its associated
laboratory space as well as aiding North Carolina Central University
(NCCU) in building the Test Gun in Duke's facility. 213 Unfortunately,
ownership of the FEL and Test Gun was not addressed in the
employment agreement between Professor Madey and Duke. 214 In the
course of trying to get the equipment transferred to his new
laboratory, Professor Madey alleged patent infringement by Duke

203.

Id.

204.

Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

205.

Id. at 863.

206.
207.

Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1349.

208.

Id. at 1352.

209.
210.

Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1352.

211.
212.

Id.
Id.

213.
214.

Madey v. Duke, 266 F.Supp.2d 420, 421-422 (M.D.N.C.,2001)
Id. (indicating the elements contained in the agreement between Madey and Duke).
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University. 215 Duke seemed to concede that both the Test Gun and
FEL read on the claims of Madey's patents 216 because Duke based its
defense for infringement of the FEL patent on the experimental use
exception using Duke's non-profit status and its defense for
infringement of the Test Gun on the fact that the Test Gun had been
21 7
used solely by researchers from NCCU after Madey's departure.
Based upon the district court's determinations that no Duke
researchers had used the Test Gun after Madey's departure, the
NCCU researcher was not an agent of Duke, and Duke had no control
over the Test Gun, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's
claim relating to Duke's
dismissal of Madey's patent 2infringement
"use" of the Test Gun Patent. 1 8 The Federal Circuit then addressed
Duke's infringement of the patents relating to the FEL and the
219
availability of the experimental use exception. Relying on Roche
0
and Judge Rader's concurrence in Embrex,22 the court held that the
non-profit or commercial status of an accused infringer did not matter
as long as the infringing activity furthered a legitimate business
interest. 22' According to the Madey court, Duke University had a
222 The
legitimate business interest in educating students and faculty.
court also pointed out that Duke University funded research projects
to increase the status of the university by luring grants, faculty, and
223
Finally, in a
students, thus furthering its business interest.
footnote, the court noted that Duke pursued an aggressive licensing
224
In so
policy, receiving a "not insubstantial revenue stream."
an
whether
for
test
a
two-prong
down
holding, the Madey court laid
act of infringement qualifies for the experimental use exception. The
infringing act (1) must be solely for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, and (2) must not be
performed in furtherance of the infringer's legitimate business
interest. 225
215.

Madey, 307 F.3d at 1353.

216.

Id.

Id. at 1362.
217.
Id. at 1363. The Federal Circuit seems to hint that Duke might be subject to
218.
vicarious or contributory infringement, but Madey failed to argue this cause of action. Id.
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
219.
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J.,
220.
concurring) (concluding that "the slightest commercial implication" disallows the experimental
use exception).
Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
221.

222.

Id.

223.

Id.

224.
225.

Id. at 1362 n.7.
Id. at 1362.
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B. Current Interpretationof Madey
Reaction to Madey has been mixed. Many scholars initially
proclaimed that Madey would be the death knell of academic
research,2 26 but others have noted that companies are loath to sue
universities for infringement, resulting in an informal experimental
use exception. 227 This informal experimental use exception has led
many to theorize that no further discussion is warranted. 228 Other
scholars prefer not to rely on the restraint of companies for the
continuation of the experimental use exception. 229 On the other hand,
many scholars argue that a formal experimental use exception is a bad
idea, and point out the increased commercialization and
industrialization of academia as the reasons why. 230 Regardless of
their views regarding the necessity of an experimental use exception,
most scholars agree that the formal experimental use exception is
dead for researchers at universities. 23 1
C. New Interpretationof Madey
Little scholarship exists defining how the Madey two-part test
should be applied. Scholars seem uninterested in defining what the
court meant by "legitimate business interests." 232 Indeed, most
scholars have assumed that the experimental use exception is

226.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 94; Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use
Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and
Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004); Joseph Mohr, Comment,

Unshackle Academia and Allow It to Exemplify the Purpose of Patent Law: 'To Promote the
Progressof Science and the Useful Arts", 88 MARQ. L. REV. 671 (2004).
227.

See, e.g., Richard J. Bauer, Comment, Why Not Try the Experiment and Stop

Pointing the Finger? Modern University Research Unaffected by a Narrow Experimental Use

Exception, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 121 (2005); Cristina Weschler, Note, The Informal
Experimental Use Exception: University Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1536 (2004).

228.

See Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do

Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006); Bauer, supra note 227;

Weschler, supra note 227.
229.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1097 (2008) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Anticommons].

230.

See, e.g., Weschler, supranote 227.

231.
Most scholars focus on calls for legislative reform or how the experimental use
exception should be applied if it is reinstated. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the
Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004); Michelle
Cai, Note, Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the Myth of Universities' Experimental Use
Defense, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175 (2004).
232.
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
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233
inapplicable to any research conducted within a university setting.
What scholars have not recognized is that the Federal Circuit's
holding in Madey only applies to infringement by a university as an
institution. Based on the argument that the university and its
234 and Madey's
academic researchers function as distinct entities
235 this Article argues that
application to institutional infringement,
academic researchers may invoke the experimental use exception
under certain circumstances.
This Article posits that the Madey experimental use exception
analysis was based on decisions and actions of Duke University that
were made as a matter of institutional policy rather than the actions
of any of its individual faculty members. Duke University withheld
the FEL and Test Gun from Professor Madey during an ownership
dispute. 236 Professor Madey claimed that Duke University directly
to
infringed his Test Gun patent by making the Test Gun available 237
(NCCU);
University
Central
Carolina
North
from
researchers
however, neither the NCCU researchers nor NCCU were named as
parties to the lawsuit. 238 The Federal Circuit held that Duke did not
directly infringe Madey's Test Gun patent because the direct infringer,
NCCU, was not an agent of the university and Duke had no direct
control over the Test Gun. 239 Thus, although the Test Gun was
located at Duke, Duke's lack of control over the researchers or the Test
Gun resulted in a lack of infringement. Similarly, in the case of the
FEL infringement, no Duke University researchers were named as
parties to the lawsuit. 240 However, since Duke effectively conceded

233.

See, e.g., Eisenberg, Anticommons, supra note 229; Rowe, supra note 228; Tom

Saunders, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants:Madey and the Future of the Experimental
Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261 (2003); Cai, supra note 231; Andrew J. Caruso, Comment, The

Experimental Use Exception: An Experimentalist's View, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 215 (2003);
Kevin Sandstrom, Note, How Much Do We Value Research and Development?: Broadening the
Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement in Light of Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v.
Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1059 (2004); Rebecca S.

Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, SCI., Feb. 14, 2003, at 1018-19.
See supra Part II.
234.
See supra Part W.A.
235.
236.

Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352.

Id. at 1353 (noting that the Test Gun Stand was owned by NCUU but housed by
237.
Duke University). The court specifically mentions that Professor Madey made no claim of
vicarious or contributory infringement. Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1351. NCCU researchers were probably not included because this suit grew
238.
out of a dispute over possession of the FEL by Duke University.
Id. at 1357.
239.
Several people were initially included in the lawsuit in their official capacities as
240.
administrators of the university. See Madey v. Duke Univ., No. 1:97CV01170, 1998 WL
35259797 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 1998) (First Amended and Supplemental Complaint) (naming as codefendants: Charles E. Putman, Senior Vice President, Research Administration Policy of Duke
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direct infringement of the FEL patent absent the experimental use
exception,2 4 1 the court had no reason to determine if research
performed by Duke's faculty members would give rise to direct
liability. Thus, the Madey decision reflects an analysis of the business
interests of Duke as an institution. 242
An analysis in light of infringement by a faculty researcher
within a university should be different from that in Madey. As
discussed in Parts I and II above, faculty researchers are largely
autonomous from the university and have different motivations than
the institution. 243 Therefore, infringement by faculty researchers
should be analyzed independently from infringement by the university
as an institution. While Madey analyzed the test for use of the
experimental use exception in the context of the university as an
institution, the definition of a "legitimate business interest" in the
context of a faculty researcher is still unclear.
D. Application of Madey to Academic Researchers
If, as suggested, the academic researcher and the university
are operating as distinct entities and have different goals and
incentives, 244 then the Madey court's determination that universities
have business interests at stake in patent infringement does not
automatically mean that university faculty and researchers have the
same business interests. Therefore, to invoke the experimental use
exception, academic scientists' research must be analyzed to
determine if it complies with the two-part test in Madey.245 The
Madey court held that for a scientist using a patented invention to
invoke the experimental use exception, the scientist must (1) be using
the invention "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly

University; John Strohbehn, Provost of Duke University; William H. Chafe, Dean of the Faculty
of Arts & Sciences of Duke University; Berndt Mueller, Chairman of the Department of Physics
of Duke University; Bobby Guenther, Interim Director of the Duke FEL Laboratory, and
Lawrence Evans, former Chairman of the Department of Physics).
241.
By defending solely with the experimental use defense, Duke effectively conceded
that, absent the defense, it had infringed Madey's patents. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d
1351, 1353 (M.D.N.C. 2001) ("Duke seems to concede that the alleged infringing devices and
methods read on the claims of the patents.").
242.
It is unclear that a defense based on lack of control of the FEL and Duke researchers
would have worked in this case because Duke seemed to have very tight control over the FEL
laboratory.
243.
See supra Parts II & III.
244.
See supra Part II.
245.
See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.

20101

PATENT AND UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

505

philosophical inquiry,"246 and (2) not further a "legitimate business
interest" of the infringing party. 247 Thus, academic researchers are
left to determine if their research is philosophical inquiry and whether
it furthers a legitimate business interest.
1. Scientific Research as a Form of Philosophical Inquiry
The first requirement that the actions be performed "for...
strictly philosophical inquiry"24 8 is derived from the original wording
of the common law exception. 249 By stating that it "could never have
been the intention of the legislature to punish a man who constructed
such a machine merely for philosophical experiments," Justice Story
created the experimental use exception to protect scientific
research. 250 Such a perception of science as philosophy is consistent
with the fact that authors have used various terms to refer to
scientific research in our historical writings. The Constitution directs
1
Congress to "promote science and the useful arts."25 Immediately, the
change in nomenclature becomes apparent as Congress derives its
copyright powers from the term "science" and its patent powers from
the term "useful arts."252 Therefore, even the precise wording in the
Constitution is different from our usage today. When Justice Story
referred to philosophical experiments, he was using "philosophy" to
mean pure science and possibly engineering. 253 This is evident not
only from the context of the case 2 54 but also from the historical use of
the term "philosophy." Judge Newman, in her Integra dissent,
255
describes the historical origins of science as natural philosophy.
This connection between science and philosophy has been very strong
and well recognized. 256 Even in today's world where science is thought

246.
2000)).
247.
248.

249.
250.

Id. at 1362 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir.

Id. at 1362.
Embrex, 216 F.2d at 1349.
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).

Id.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
251.
Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U. S.
252.
Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 50-51 (1949).
Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
253.
Id. at 1120-22.
254.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
255.
(Newman, J., dissenting) (describing the historical origins of science as natural philosophy).
Will Durant stated the relationship elegantly: 'The relation of science to philosophy
256.
needs no further clarification: the sciences are the windows through which philosophy sees the
world, they are the senses of which it is the soul; without it their knowledge is as chaotically
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of as objective, there is a realization that "fundamentals of a scientific
understanding [are] not a static unchanging set of natural laws,
rather these paradigms [are] human interpretations of phenomena as
much dependant on the community in which they surfaced as on the
nature of reality herself."257
Courts have recognized that there are experimental uses that,
while scientific, do go beyond philosophical inquiry. For example, the
Federal Circuit referred to these uses in Roche when it spoke of
experimental use that was in the "guise of scientific inquiry."258 A
review of patent cases reveals that scientific philosophy is often
contrasted with commercial research. With respect to when a patent
should be granted, the Supreme Court noted that the "patent system
must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of
philosophy." 259 Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Roche held that the
experimental use exception would not apply because Bolar's use had
"definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes." 260
It is these extensions of philosophical inquiry that give rise to the
question of a legitimate business interest in Madey.
2. The Legitimate Business Interest of Academic Researchers
Once an alleged act of infringement is determined to be a form
of philosophical inquiry, the question becomes whether the
infringement furthers a legitimate business interest of the user.
While the idea of philosophical inquiry is relatively straightforward,
the definition of a "legitimate business interest" is unclear and
depends on the identity of the entity infringing on the patent.
Unfortunately, the Madey court muddied the waters by broadening
the definition of a business interest to include interests related to noncommercial entities 26 1 without specifically defining what such a
business interest could be. Instead, Judge Rader merely referred to
"any reasonable interpretation of Duke's legitimate business
interest."262 It may be that Judge Rader used the "I know it when I

helpless as sensations that come to a disordered mind, making an idiot's lore." WILL DURANT,
THE PLEASURES OF PHILOSOPHY: A SURVEY OF HUMAN LIFE AND DESTINY 7 (1953).
257.
Philosophy of Science, by Roger Jones, http://www.philosopher.org.uk/sci.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2010).
258.
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharms. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
259.
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965,

970 (C.C.P.A. 1965)).
260. Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
261.

Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

262.

Id.
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see it"263 standard of defining a legitimate business interest. However,
it seems reasonable that lower courts and scientists might need more
guidance.
Therefore, the first step in determining whether an academic
researcher can use the experimental use exception should be to
determine exactly what the business interests of the academic
researcher are. The Federal Circuit has been very clear that any
commercial use is a legitimate business interest of the alleged
infringer. 264 Experiments that have "definite cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes" 265 or the "slightest commercial
implications" 266 are only in the "guise" of philosophical inquiry267 and
are a legitimate business interest. Defining the business interest of a
non-commercial entity is much less clear. In Madey, the Federal
Circuit declared that Duke University had specific business objectives.
Those objectives included educating students and faculty, 268 obtaining
research grants, and sanctioning research projects in order to increase
its reputation. 269 Additionally, the court pointed to the "aggressive
patent licensing program" as a source of revenue and, presumably, a
2 70
commercial interest.
However, since the university and the academic researcher
have been shown to be acting as distinct entities for purposes of
scientific research and to have very different goals and incentives, the
business objectives of the university are very different from the
business objective of the academic researcher. Therefore, the question
of how to define the business objective of the academic researcher
remains.
This author posits that most academic researchers in the
laboratory are focused solely on conducting scientific research. Put
another way, the business of most academic researchers is
philosophical inquiry.2 7 1 This stands in contrast to that of the
university, which does not, as an institution, conduct research.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (declining to
263.
define hard-core pornography).
Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
264.
265.
Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
266.
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Roche, 733 F.2d at 863.
267.
268.
Madey, 307 F.3d at 1356.

269.
270.

Id. at 1362.
Id.

The author acknowledges that some academic research is conducted for reasons
271.
other than philosophical inquiry. However, the framework for determining whether the academic
research at issue is conducted for philosophical inquiry (and thus whether it is eligible for the
experimental use exception) is complex and beyond the scope of this article.
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Instead, it receives money and prestige, and owes its existence as a
research institution to the philosophical inquiry of others. 27 2 Activities
conducted to further philosophical inquiry, when that inquiry is the
sole business of the researcher, should not be considered to be
"furthering a business objective" for the purposes of disallowing the
experimental use exception. If such activities were considered to
further a business objective, this interpretation would define the
experimental use exception out of existence. In a time period where
almost all philosophical inquiry requires massive inputs of equipment
and reagents which are borne by the federal government and other
granting agencies, almost all research is conducted in institutional
contexts rather than basements or garages.
In whatever manner the "business objective" of a given
academic researcher is defined, it is this definition that should guide
the analysis of whether the experimental use exception defense is
appropriate.
The distinct nature of the role of the academic
researcher within the university indicates that an academic
researcher is acting on her own behalf when conducting infringing
activities.
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS ACADEMIC

RESEARCHERS REVEALS THE ENTREPRENEURIAL NATURE OF FACULTY
Scholars have spent much time lamenting the lack of
entrepreneurial drive of faculty members and devising the best way to
get university faculty to accept and internalize the goal of transferring
new technology to the private sector, hopefully with large financial
returns.2 73 However, such an attitude represents a misunderstanding
of the entrepreneurial nature of faculty researchers.
Principal
Investigators are indeed entrepreneurial. As noted above, Principal
Investigators have been analogized to CEOs due to the leadership of
the laboratory. 274 In fact the nature of running a laboratory, including
funding resources and publication, can also be analogized to a
business cycle. Unfortunately for university technology transfer
offices, the incentives of the research business cycle are often different
from incentives that apply to corporations. An understanding of the
entrepreneurial business cycle of research and the incentives at
various points on the cycle may reveal better techniques for

272.
university
273.
274.

See discussion of university laboratories acting as independent firms within a
supraPart II.A.
See Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19; see also discussion supra Part H.B.
See supra Part U.A
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incentivizing faculty researchers to choose to take part in university
technology transfer initiatives.
A. The Academic Research Business Cycle
The problem facing universities trying to encourage faculty
members to embrace the goals of technology transfer is not a lack of
entrepreneurial spirit among faculty. Rather, the problem is the lack
of understanding of the nature of that entrepreneurial spirit. The
university's technology transfer office acts much like the prototypical
entrepreneur looking for the best and most profitable ways to transfer
technology to the private sector. 275 Policymakers and scholars viewing
the universities' embrace of such technology transfer techniques 276 do
not understand the faculty member's reluctance to accept these same
Even authors who acknowledge that academic
incentives. 277
from private industry
may be different
entrepreneurship
entrepreneurship do not recognize the idea that academic
entrepreneurship may not be commercial in nature at all.278
Understanding the distinction between the academic researcher and
the university allows scholars to redefine the concept of
entrepreneurship in the context of academic research, and to use that
definition to properly incentivize academic researchers.
Faculty members can be viewed as small business owners in
many respects. The Principal Investigator, above analogized to a
2 79
CEO, runs the lab much like a small firm within the university.
She alone determines the best course of research, develops a business
plan (grant proposal), and procures funding by convincing investors
(the National Institutes of Health or the Department of Energy, for
example) to invest in her ideas (fund the grant). Once she has
funding, the Principal Investigator hires and manages people to make
her product (carry out her research) as efficiently as possible, both
economically and time-wise. Once her research yields profit (research
data or new technology), she determines the most effective way to
The statistics published each year by AUTM are an indication that universities
275.
value the license revenue from patents. See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88. Additionally, such
revenue is a source of cachet to the university. See Dreyfuss, supra note 94 (discussing the trend
for universities to view successful technology transfer offices as prestige-increasing).
276.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 94, at 464-66.
277.
Cf. Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 19, at 1272 (listing reasons why
researchers might choose to ignore requirements to disclose inventions to tech transfer officer).
278.
See Nicola Lacetera, Academic Entrepreneurship,30 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
443, 443-44 (2009) (analyzing the difference between academic and private industry
entrepreneurship in the context of a response to options to commercialize).
Etzkowitz, supra note 23.
279.
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reinvest her profits (typically publication, but perhaps technology
disclosure and patenting) to begin the cycle again and achieve
business stability (future funding and tenure). To say that such a
process does not require entrepreneurial spirit is to completely
misunderstand the motivations of the academic researcher.
Based on the way a Principal Investigator runs her laboratory,
it is easy to see that faculty members have motivations that are
similar to small business owners.
Both desire to determine
individualized paths that will benefit them in the long run. However,
personal profits do not motivate academic researchers in the same
way that they motivate a small business owner. In fact, most
academic researchers could make significantly more money
performing very similar research in private industry, but choose to
take less pay to work on personally interesting problems. Both need
to produce the best product possible and determine the best way to use
past success to build new growth.
B. Usage of Monetary Incentives
The largest distinction between an entrepreneurial faculty
member and a small business owner is the desire for money. 28 0 Money
is much less of a motivator for an academic researcher to perform
research than it is for a business owner to go into business. Although
funding is important to the academic researcher, after a relatively
steady salary is paid to the researcher, excess funds generally go
toward conducting more research. 28 1 Academic researchers do not
write exceedingly large grant proposals in the hope that they will
become correspondingly rich.
Unfortunately for the university, the university's largest
incentive to encourage faculty to disclose new technology is the
sharing of profits with the faculty inventor if the invention is
commercialized. This profit-sharing incentive historically has not
been sufficient to incentivize researchers. Practically speaking, less
than 50 percent of inventions with commercial potential are disclosed
to the university before publication.28 2 Empirical studies that have
shown the profit-sharing incentive to be of limited value to academic

280.
Aghion, Dewatipont & Stein, supranote 42, at 621.
281.
Many grants include a salary limitation. Thus, while some of the funds of any given
grant may go toward a researcher's salary, that salary is capped. See, e.g., Northwestern
University,
Office
for
Sponsored
Research,
NIH
Salary
Cap,
http://www.research.northwestern.edu/osrfb-salary-limit.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
282.
Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supranote 19, at 1272.
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researchers explain the low participation in commercialization on the
28 3
part of researchers.
These monetary
Such a result should be unsurprising.
incentives of sharing profits upon commercialization are unlikely to be
efficient motivators for academic researchers because such incentives
do not influence a major decision of the business cycle of academic
researchers. Once a researcher has a new technology, she must
determine the best use of the technology and her time in order to
continue to receive more funding and job stability such as tenure.
While an invention disclosure may result in funding in the distant
future, the academic researcher may decide that publication and
further grant writing is a better use of her time than filing an
invention disclosure, unless there are industrial contacts waiting to
license the new technology. Such a decision is probably rational. In
2007, universities filed new patent applications on only 60 percent of
invention disclosures that academic researchers filed with the
university. 28 4 It is unclear how many of those applications proceeded
to the licensing stage, but with only 4,419 new licenses signed,
including licenses for inventions from previous years, the possibility
28 5
that a new invention will yield a large return is relatively slim.
Additionally, once a potential licensee is found, the researcher has no
input as to the terms of the license. 28 6 Thus, even if profit sharing
might incentivize a researcher, the fact that the researcher has no
control over the amount of revenue that the technology will generate
decreases such incentives.
Incentives, either monetary or otherwise, aimed at the decision
of disclosure would be far more effective. For instance, credit toward
tenure for patents (or even invention disclosures whether or not the
university chose to pursue a patent) would be far more likely to
incentivize academic researchers to disclose a new invention than the
potential for future earnings. Monetary prizes directed at funding
research to further develop the new technology might also be an
incentive to disclosure, as such prizes would directly impact the ability
of the academic researcher to continue research.

283.

Id. at 1273.

284.

See AUTM REPORT, supra note 88.
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In fact, the prestige of the academic research has no effect on the license terms
286.
granted. Elfenbein, supranote 53, at 689.
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C. Overcoming Social Norms against Commercialization
In addition to the current misapplication of monetary
incentives, academic researchers are often bound by social norms that
conflict with or are perceived to conflict with the university's interest
in technology transfer. 2 7 The publication norm is of immense concern
to many academic researchers as it directly impacts the tenure
prospects of a faculty member.
Faculty members often do not
understand that publication and university commercialization can and
should co-exist. Educating faculty about intellectual property rights,
explaining the potential bars to protection, and describing a best
practice for incorporating both publication and commercialization
could fairly easily resolve this problem.
More troubling to many faculty members is the potential
violation of the norm of free sharing of information and technology. It
is difficult to incentivize an academic researcher to disclose a new
technology if she believes that such disclosure will limit the ability of
others to use her invention due to restrictive licensing agreements
with industry. 288 Additionally, recent studies have shown that one of
the largest impediments to technology sharing has become interuniversity material transfer agreements, as each university becomes
more protective of technology created within its halls. 28 9 Such
problems may leave academic researchers feeling as though
intellectual property protection creates more problems than it solves.
There are several ways to address this problem. Education
regarding the importance of intellectual property and the best way to
transition academic inventions to the public is a key component of
changing the way academic researchers think about intellectual
property protection for new inventions. 290 In fact, once a Principal
Investigator buys into the concept of invention disclosure and
commercialization, other members of the laboratory, especially
graduate students, become far more accepting of the concept. 291
Listening to the academic researcher and working to cooperate
with her to accomplish some free dissemination may also directly
287.
See supra Part II.B.
288.
See WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 159 (citing examples of researchers who prefer free
dissemination over licensing); supra Part II.B (discussing the social norms of free dissemination
of research).
289.
Walsh, Cohen & Cho, supra note 55, 1185-86; John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho &
Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, SCI., Sept. 23, 2005, at
2002-03.
290.
Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Academic Entrepreneurs: Organization
Change at the Individual Level, 19 ORG. SCI. 69, 84-86 (2008).
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address the norm perceived to be in conflict with technology transfer.
An academic researcher who believes that her invention should be
freely disseminated may be correct.
Some inventions are easily
disseminated without licenses or large investments.
Computer
software is a prototypical case. Many computer scientists would
prefer to release software under an open source distribution. 292 Such
open source software could be widely distributed and improved upon
with little investment by users. In such cases, the university should
listen to the input of the researcher and find a way to transfer the
technology without tying the invention with intellectual property
rights.
In more complicated cases, development of a technology may
require high levels of investment, requiring exclusive rights to attract
investors. Again, communication between academic researchers and
the university will be essential. If the university can preserve some
means of free distribution of the technology, such as by reserving a
non-commercial research license for universities or executing narrow
licenses limited to one element or field of use for the invention,
academic researchers might be more likely to disclose inventions to
the university.
V. CONCLUSION

Practical examination of the structure and function of academic
laboratories illustrate how patent law should view the distinct nature
of academic researchers within the university.
The university
structure stands in contrast to the relationship that scientists working
within industry have with a corporate employer. Additionally, social
norms within the academic research community further strengthen
the distinction. Academic researchers value those social norms, which
often underlie the idea of independence from the university. For
instance, academic freedom highlights the idea that academic
researchers conduct research programs without true university
oversight. Also, norms related to free dissemination of data speak to
the often divergent goals and incentives of the university and its
faculty. Finally, patent law has implicitly recognized the distinction
between the university and its academic researchers in the context of
patent ownership and sovereign immunity.
This distinction between the university and its faculty
researchers has implications for the application of the experimental
use exception to patent infringement by academic researchers.
292.
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Current case law abolishes the use of the experimental use exception
for university infringement. This author posits that the case law
should be read so as to limit such infringement liability to
institutional infringement rather than abolishing the experimental
use exception for individual academic researchers. Analysis of the
application of the defense should focus on the business interests of the
researcher rather than those of the university. A business interest of
an academic researcher has not yet been defined.
Finally, the distinction between the university and its
researchers sheds light on the entrepreneurial nature of the academic
researcher. Academic researchers are highly entrepreneurial, albeit
in an unorthodox manner that does not focus on personal monetary
incentives. In fact, the pattern of research can be analogized to a
business cycle with multiple decision points. Once the entrepreneurial
nature of the academic researcher is better understood, new incentives
and strategies can be implemented to increase technology transfer
participation by academic researchers by focusing on the decision
points important to researchers.

